Abstract-Wholesale electricity markets in many jurisdictions use a two-settlement structure: a day-ahead market for bulk power transactions and a real-time market for fine-grain supplydemand balancing. This paper explores trading demand response assets within this two-settlement market structure. We consider two approaches for trading demand response assets: (a) an intermediate spot market with contingent pricing, and (b) an overthe-counter options contract. In the first case, we characterize the competitive equilibrium of the spot market, and show that it is socially optimal. Economic orthodoxy advocates spot markets, but these require expensive infrastructure and regulatory blessing. In the second case, we characterize competitive equilibria and compare its efficiency with the idealized spot market. Options contract are private bilateral over-the-counter transactions and do not require regulatory approval. We show that the optimal social welfare is, in general, not supported. We then design optimal option prices that minimize the social welfare gap. This optimal design serves to approximate the ideal spot market for demand response using options with modest loss of efficiency. Our results are validated through numerical simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wholesale electricity markets in many jurisdictions use a two-settlement structure: a day-ahead market for bulk power transactions and a real-time market for fine-grain supplydemand balancing. Forecast errors in the day-ahead market necessitate subsequent balancing in the real-time market. With deeper penetrations of wind and solar generation, markets must be able to contend with greater levels of uncertainty stemming from renewable intermittency. Forecast errors increase, and balancing supply and demand becomes more challenging. The traditional approach of balancing using conventional fossil fuel based reserves is untenable: it is expensive and defeats the emissions benefits of renewables. Balancing the variability of intermittent renewable generation through demand flexibility is a far better alternative to reserve generation, as it produces no emissions and consumes no resources. This is recognized and encouraged by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) through its Order 745, which mandates that demand response be compensated on par with the conventional generation that supplies grid power [1] . Commercial buildings, light industry, and households are flexible in their electricity consumption. These agents can be induced to yield this flexibility in exchange for monetary compensation. This paper explores trading demand response assets within a traditional two-settlement market structure.
We consider the setting where a Load Serving Entity (LSE) supplies electricity to a collection of consumers at the delivery time T . An aggregator manages the aggregate load flexibility of these consumers. The LSE interacts directly with the aggregator and can request a certain aggregate load reduction which will be reliably produced at the delivery time. The LSE can purchase bulk power in the day-ahead market and can also buy balancing power in the real-time market. It also has access to zero marginal cost renewable generation. We consider the situation where excess renewable generation is spilled, and cannot be sold back into the real-time market. Other generalizations of our results are possible, but we choose to explore the simplest situation.
When should demand response assets be traded? Well in advance of the delivery time, the LSE has poor forecasts of its renewable generation and of clearing prices in the realtime market. So the LSE prefers to delay its demand response request close to the delivery time. Conversely, the aggregator prefers to receive any load curtailment requests well before the delivery time. This affords its client consumers sufficient lead time to organize their electricity use and cede their demand reduction. These considerations argue that demand response assets should be traded in an intermediate market as a recourse between the day-ahead and real-time markets.
What is an appropriate mechanism for the intermediate time trading of demand response assets? Economic orthodoxy argues in favor of an idealized spot market with contingent prices from the perspective of efficiency. In this intermediate spot market, trading takes place after counter-parties digest all information that is revealed. Therefore, the clearing prices are contingent on the realized information. While the spot market is efficient, it has two main drawbacks: (a) pricing is typically very volatile and does not offer guaranteed income to demand response assets to compensate for yielding their load flexibility and for the associated capital costs, and (b) an intermediate spot market requires organized infrastructure and regulatory approval which can be very expensive.
To overcome these difficulties, we propose to trade demand response assets using call options. In our scheme, the LSE buys a number of call options contracts from the aggregator at time t o , coincident with the gate closure of the day-ahead market. It pays an option price π o per contract. Each call option contract affords the LSE the right, but not the obligation, to receive one unit of load reduction from the aggregator. These options expire at the intermediate time t 1 by which time they must be exercised or forfeited. To exercise these options the LSE must pay the aggregator the strike price π it is fixed and known at time t o . Payment from the sale of option contracts provides a guaranteed income to flexible loads for their demand response capability. Subsequent payment from the exercise of option contracts compensates loads for the provision of demand response. Since option contracts can be viewed as private over-the-counter transactions between the LSE and the aggregator, our scheme does not require regulatory blessing or organized market infrastructure.
A. Our Contributions
Our principal contributions are:
• First, we consider optimal energy scheduling from the perspective of a social planner. We formulate this as a three stage optimization problem and characterize the optimal decisions at each stage: the optimal energy purchase in the day-ahead market, the optimal demand response (or load curtailment) decision at the intermediate stage, and the balancing energy purchase in the real-time market. This serves as a benchmark for evaluating other market designs.
• Second, we consider an intermediate spot market with contingent pricing. We study the interactions of the LSE and the aggregator in a spot-market. We show that there exists a competitive equilibrium, and the equilibrium is socially optimal, i.e., it realizes the same system cost as the benchmark.
• Third, we study the options market for the LSE and the aggregator. We show that under some conditions, a competitive equilibrium always exists, and it is the optimal solution to a convex optimization problem. We compare the efficiency of the equilibrium for the options market and the spot market, and show that the options market is not necessarily socially optimal. We then design optimal option and prices which minimize the welfare gap at the competitive equilibrium.
B. Related Work
There is extensive literature on demand response and work related to managing the uncertainty with renewable integration [2] - [17] . These works can be broadly classified as price-based or contract-based.
Price-based Demand Response: This is a type of demand response where the consumers alter their energy consumption based on time varying prices determined apriori by the LSE. The objective here is to improve overall system benefits by influencing the consumers to shift their demand. The works in [2] - [4] propose different approaches to determine the time varying prices such that the overall system benefits, measured in terms of efficiency and load variability, are improved. The authors in [7] , [8] study a game theoretic formulation and propose a pricing strategy that improves system benefits in Nash equilibrium. Closely related works such as [6] propose a time varying price policy to utilize flexible storage of EVs in order to manage load variability. Other works such as [5] propose a demand response management strategy using a stochastic optimization procedure that accounts for financial risks associated with time varying prices.
Distributed Price-based Demand Response: Authors in [12] , [13] and [14] propose iterative distributed load control schemes with the objective of meeting system requirements and minimizing consumer discomfort. They primarily address the coordination of multiple demand response users by iteratively discovering the most appropriate electricity price and its variation with time.
On the contrary, the setting we consider is different from the above works, which are primarily concerned with priceresponsive demand response. We consider direct scheduling of demand response instead of using price to influence demand. The scheduling problem is posed as a multi-stage decision problem. Here, a LSE can buy DR contracts from aggregators of DR in the day-ahead market and can determine the amount of DR to call or schedule in the real-time market at an intermediate stage, based on the information revealed by then on the availability of renewable resources during the actual dispatch.
Multi-stage Stochastic Decision: Varaiya et al. [18] propose a risk-limiting dispatch approach for integrating renewable energy in the grid. They formulate a multi-stage stochastic control problem where at each stage the utility makes purchase decisions based on the available information. Rajagopal et al. [19] extend this approach and characterize optimal power procurement policies as threshold based decisions. Our work parallels the approach of Varaiya et al. [18] . In particular, we extend their approach to a contract setting as proposed in this paper, where the decision of two entities are coordinated in a multi-stage decision problem through an options contract mechanism.
Contract-based Demand Response: The works in [10] , [11] , [20] address the problem of demand response aggregation from a mechanism design perspective. The objective of the mechanism design is to gather demand response contracts at minimal cost and at preferrably maximal privacy so that the aggregator or the LSE can meet the DR requirements of the system. Alternatively, demand response contracts that treat demand response as a differentiated good, based on their power level and duration, have also been proposed [21] , [22] . Our work is different from these set of works in the sense that we provide a multi-settlement market framework to determine scheduling of the aggregated demand response. In this sense we complement the demand response work developed by these authors.
The paper is organized as follows. We introduce the basic notions and notation in Section II. In Section III, we consider the problem of energy scheduling with demand response from the perspective of a system planner. In Section IV we discuss the implementation of intermediate spot market for scheduling demand response. We present the options market mechanism in Section V. Finally, we conclude the paper with a brief description of future research directions in Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
The setting we consider is shown in Figure 1 . A load serving entity (LSE) supplies l units of electricity to a collection of consumers for delivery at time T . The demand l is considered inelastic and known at time t o . Indeed, day-ahead load forecast errors are within 1%−2% [23] . The LSE buys q units of energy in the day-ahead market at price π da . At the intermediate time t 1 , he extracts y units of demand response, which incurs a disutility of φ(y). The LSE has access to zero marginal cost random renewable generation w which is realized at the delivery time T . To meet its demand obligations, the LSE buys the remaining energy required q rt in the real-time market at price π rt . The total energy purchase must satisfy:
Note that we consider the situation where excess renewable generation is spilled, and cannot be sold back into the realtime market. The demand response purchase made at the intermediate time t 1 is based on a forecast f 1 of w and forecast of π rt .
A. Model Uncertainties
Let f 0 denote the information available at t o . Let p(w|S) be the conditional probability of the wind given the intermediate forecast state S at time t 1 . The forecast state S can be regarded as a sufficient statistic which parameterizes the information on wind at time t 1 . We parameterize S ∈ [0, 1]. We call this an information state. Define
where P s (z) is the probability that the wind at time T is less than z given the information state s. Let α(s) be the prior probability density function of the information state, i.e., α(s) = P (S = s|f 0 )
We assume that real-time price π rt is a random variable and denote the expected real-time price conditioned on the information state by,
The day-ahead price π da is known at time t 0 . We use E S [·] and
to denote the expectation with respect to the information state and the randomness in wind, respectively. Let E [·] denote the joint expectation. We make the following assumptions.
rt and w are conditionally independent given the information state s.
Assumption (i) imposes a stochastic ordering on wind conditioned on the information state s ∈ [0, 1]. The intuitive interpretation is that, larger values of s indicate (stochastically) more wind. This assumption guarantees that P s (z) < P s (z), ∀z, if s > s so that the cumulative distribution P s (·) and P s (·) do not intersect. Assumption (ii) similarly imposes an ordering on the expected value of the real-time price conditioned on the information state. We assume that higher values of s indicate a lower expected real-time price (because more wind power reduces demand in the real-time market).
B. Decision Making of Players
The players of the problem include an LSE, an aggregator, and a social planner. We model them as follows. Load Serving Entity (LSE): The LSE is responsible for satisfying the energy balance specified by equation (1) . At time t 0 , it buys q units of energy at a price π da from the day-ahead market. At time t 1 , it receives a load reduction of y s units from the aggregator when the information state s is revealed, and makes a payment R s (y s ). At time T , the renewable w is revealed, and the LSE purchases the remaining energy from the real-time market, i.e., q rt = (l − q − y s − w) + . The ex-post cost for the LSE given the information state s is,
Aggregator: The aggregator suffers a disutility φ(y s ) for a load reduction of y s units, and receives a compensation payment R s (y s ) from the LSE. The ex-post cost for the aggregator, given the information state s, is as follows,
We assume that the disutility function satisfies the assumption given below.
Assumption 2. φ(y s ) is twice differentiable, and is strictly convex in y s , i.e., φ (y s ) > 0.
Social Planner or Entity (e):
We consider a hypothetical agent, the social planner, which combines the roles of the LSE and the aggregator. We denote decision variables and cost functions of the social planner with the superscript e for entity. This social planner buys q units of energy from the day-ahead market, receives a load curtailment of y s units at an intermediate time t 1 , acquires zero marginal-cost realized wind power w at time T , and purchases the remaining energy (l − q − y s − w) + from the real-time market for load balance. Given s, the ex-post cost for the social planner (also called the system cost) is:
Payment for demand response is an internal exchange between the LSE and aggregator, and does not appear in the social planner ledger. In the sequel, we first discuss the optimal scheduling problem for the social planner, and then we study the interaction between the LSE and the aggregator in the intermediate market and options market. We characterize the competitive equilibrium in both markets, and compare the system costs.
III. OPTIMAL SCHEDULING FOR THE SOCIAL PLANNER
This section studies the optimal scheduling of energy from the perspective of the social planner. We separately consider the scheduling problems with and without demand response. We use these solutions as benchmarks to compare the various market mechanisms we propose in subsequent sections.
A. Optimal Scheduling without Demand Response
In the absence of demand response, the social planner is confined to purchase energy from the day-ahead and realtime markets. Let J e ndr (q) be the expected cost for the social planner in the absence of demand response. This is a function of the day-ahead purchase q and is
This implicitly accounts for the balance inequality (1) necessary to service the load l. The optimal decision of the social planner is q e ndr = arg min
We have the following:
Assumption 3. To avoid trivial results, we assume that the day-ahead market price is discounted from the expected realtime market price, i.e.,
]. This will ensure that q e ndr > 0.
B. Optimal Scheduling with Demand Response
With demand response, the net expected cost for the social planner as a function of the first-stage purchase is given by,
where J e s (y s ; q) is the expected second-stage cost conditioned on s and q and is given by,
The optimal first-stage and second-stage decisions, q e and y e s respectively, are q e = arg min q≥0 J e (q),
The optimal system cost is then J * e = J e (q e ). Using the fact that both (8) and (9) are convex, we can solve for q e and y e s using the conditions given in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. J e (·) and J e s (·) are convex. For any given first stage decision q, the second-stage decision y e s is given by,
The first-stage decision q e is given by the solution of,
The proof is offered in Appendix B.
C. Socially Optimal Costs
The optimal costs for the social planner with and without demand response are
respectively. Clearly, J * dr ≤ J * ndr . These social cost values serve as benchmarks for our market mechanism designs. In Section IV, we show that a spot market with contingent prices realizes the socially optimal cost J * dr . In Section V, we show that trading demand response in an options market will, in general, result in a loss of social welfare. We further select options prices so that this welfare gap is modest. As a result, the over-the-counter options market can well approximate the idealized spot market.
IV. SPOT MARKETS WITH CONTINGENT PRICES
In Section III, we considered the optimal scheduling of energy from the perspective of a hypothetical social planner. We now show that the optimal scheduling decisions of the social planner can be realized through a spot market with contingent prices. In this market, the LSE is a buyer, and the aggregator is the seller.
At time t 0 , the LSE buys q units of energy from the dayahead market at a price π da . At time t 1 , the information state s is revealed. Depending on this revelation, the LSE purchases y s units of energy curtailment from the aggregator, paying a price π in s . This is a contingent price as it depends on the realized information state s. At time t, the LSE receives wind energy w and purchases the required balancing energy (l −q − y s −w) + from the real-time market at a price π rt . The expected cost for the LSE as a function of the first-stage purchase q is given by,
where J LSE s (y s ; q) is the second stage cost and is given by,
The optimal first and second-stage purchase decisions of the LSE are q LSE and y
LSE s
respectively. These are given by
The expected cost for the aggregator under the information
The optimal selling decision of the aggregator is
Note that the optimal buying/selling decisions of agents (LSE/aggregator) depend on the contingent prices π in s . The market is said to be in equilibrium if the prices are such that the optimal buying and selling decisions of the agents are consistent under all realizations of s. We make this notion more precise below.
Definition 1 (Competitive Equilibrium with Contingent Prices).
The contingent prices {π * in s }, optimal buying decisions of the LSE q * LSE , {y * LSE s }, optimal selling decisions of the aggregator {y * agg s } constitute a competitive equilibrium, if the following holds for all s ∈ S:
Here (16a) and (16b) require (q * LSE , y * LSE s ) to be the optimal decision of the buyer, (16c) requires y * agg s to be the optimal decision of the seller, and (16d) ensures that the traded demand response quantities are in balance. We require this balance at all realizations of s.
Let J * LSE be the expected cost for the LSE, and let J * agg be the expected cost for the aggregator at any competitive equilibrium. The system cost of the market at any competitive equilibrium is
Define the minimum system cost for the social planner as J * e = J e (q e ). This is a lower bound of the system cost for any market. Therefore, we can use J * e as a benchmark to evaluate the efficiency of the options market. The market is called efficient (or socially optimal) if the system cost for the market attains the lower bound J * e at the competitive equilibrium. We make this precise below.
Definition 2 (Socially Optimal Equilibrium with Contingent Prices
). An equilibrium with contingent prices is said to be socially optimal, if J * cp = J * e .
We now offer the main result of this section. 
The proof is deferred to Appendix C. Condition (18) requires that competitive equilibrium is the optimal solution to the social planner's problem. Therefore, it can be computed by solving (11) and (12) . This result implies that the optimal scheduling of the social planner can be realized though an intermediate spot market with contingent prices.
V. OPTIONS MARKETS AND COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM
In the previous section, we showed that the intermediate spot market is efficient. However, implementing intermediate spot markets requires organized infrastructure and regulatory approval which can be prohibitive. We now present an intermediate market for demand response using call options. These are private over-the-counter transactions which do not need utility blessing or organized infrastructure.
A. Options Market
At time t 0 , the LSE purchases energy q in the day-ahead market. Concurrently, he buys x units of options from the aggregator at the option price π o . By purchasing these options, the LSE acquires the right, without the obligation, to receive y units of load reduction from the aggregator where 0 ≤ y ≤ x. At time t 1 , the LSE can exercise these options by paying a strike price π sp per contract. Clearly, the number of exercised options y s depends on the information state s revealed at time t 1 . The strike price π sp is ex ante, and does not depend on the information state. At time T , the aggregator delivers the contractually obligated load reduction y s . The LSE observes the wind energy w and purchases the remaining balancing energy (l − q − y s − w) + in the real time market.
Since we are considering a competitive market, we assume the agents are rational and price takers. They make their buying/selling decisions based on the market prices π o and π sp . The expected cost for the LSE is a function of the first stage decisions q and x:
HereJ LSE s (·) is the second stage cost for the LSE given bỹ
Denote the optimal first and second- In the options market, the expected cost for the aggregator isJ
The decision variable of the aggregator is the quantity of options x offered for sale. The optimal selling decision is:
We now define an equilibrium notion for our options market.
Definition 3 (Competitive Equilibrium for Options Market).
The options price π * o , the strike price π * LSE , the optimal day-ahead purchaseq * , the optimal buying decision of the LSEx * LSE and the optimal selling decision of the aggregator x * agg constitute a competitive equilibrium if
At the competitive equilibrium, the volume of options that the LSE is willing to buy balances the volume of options that the aggregator is willing to sell. Therefore, we havex LSE = x agg . We now offer the main results of this section. . Then the competitive equilibrium satisfies,
The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix D.
B. Redesign of Options Market
The options market proposed in the previous section is asymmetric with respect to the decision of the buyer and the seller. That is the decision of the LSE is q and x, while the decision of the aggregator is only x. This asymmetry can provide market advantage to the buyer. To address this concern, we propose a redesign of the options market where the decision of the buyer and the seller is symmetric. We show the existence of a competitive equilibrium, and study its various properties.
B.1 Symmetric Decision Making
Consider the following modification to the options market: before time t 0 , the aggregator proposes a demand response offer to the LSE. The aggregator chooses l > 0 and dictates that x + q = l . This endows the aggregator the power to negotiate on q: the aggregator offers x units of options, only if the LSE buys l −x units of energy in the day-ahead market. For the moment, we treat l as given.
Upon receiving the demand response offer, the LSE decides whether or not to accept it. There is no trade of load reduction if the offer is not accepted. When the offer is accepted, the expected cost for the LSE is 
(24) The optimal first and second-stage decisions of the LSE are
Note that the second-stage decisionỹ LSE s depends on x. From now on, we do not express this dependence explicitly as it is implied by context. The expected cost for the aggregator and its optimal decisions remain as in (21) and (22) .
The choice of l is determined by the willingness of the LSE to accept the demand response offer. If the LSE accepts the offer, its optimal cost isJ LSE (x LSE ). Else, its cost is equal to that of optimal cost without DR, i.e., J * e ndr . Thus, the LSE will accept the contract proposed by the aggregator if
However,J LSE (x LSE ) depends on the options price π o , which is not revealed when the LSE makes the decision. Ideally, l should be such that (26) holds for any π o . We present a candidate of l that satisfies this condition: Proposition 3. If l = q e ndr , the LSE always accepts the demand response offer, i.e., J * e
The idea is as follows: q = q e ndr is the optimal decision of the LSE if it declines the demand response offer. Therefore, when l = q e ndr , the LSE loses nothing if it accepts the demand response offer. This is because, there exists a LSE decision, i.e., x = 0 and q = q e ndr , that satisfies the condition x + q = q e ndr and also attains the same cost.
B.2 Properties of Competitive Equilibrium
We now focus on the existence, efficiency and optimality of the competitive equilibrium for options market.
Theorem 3. Given any l ∈ [0, l], there exists a competitive equilibrium (π * o , π * sp ,x * LSE ,x * agg ) for the options market, andx * LSE =x * agg is the optimal solution to:
is the second stage optimal decision for the LSE and,
The proof is given in Appendix E. The optimization problem (27) is convex, and the optimal value of (27) is the social cost at the competitive equilibrium of the options market.
To compare the efficiency of different markets, let J * LSE (π sp ) andJ * agg (π sp ) be the expected cost at competitive equilibrium for the LSE and the aggregator, respectively. Define the system cost at competitive equilibrium by,
In addition, let J * e ndr be the optimal value of problem (5), then the following proposition provides a comparison of the optimal cost of the different markets that we have discussed so far.
Proposition 4. Given any l and π sp , the social cost of the options market at the competitive equilibrium is lower bounded by J * cp and upper bounded by J * e ndr , i.e.,
ndr . The proof of Proposition 4 is given in the Appendix. It indicates that the efficiency of the options market outperforms that of the market without demand response, but is no better than that of the spot market with contingent prices.
The following theorem presents the optimal strike price that minimizes the social cost at the competitive equilibrium: 
The proof of Theorem 4 is in the Appendix. It shows that the optimal strike price is the average of the marginal disutility over a skewed distribution β(s).
VI. CASE STUDIES
We illustrate our results through numerical simulations. Let l = 3MW and set the day-ahead price at 60$/MWh. Assume the information state s is uniformly distributed, i.e., s ∼ U [0, 1]. Let p(w|s) be the conditional distribution of wind given the intermediate information s. Assume this is also uniformly distributed as
From (31), it is clear that the cumulative distribution of wind satisfies P s1 (w) ≥ P s2 (w) for ∀s 1 < s 2 . Therefore, larger values of s indicates (stochastically) more wind power. Suppose the conditional expectation of the real-time price is a linear function of s in the formπ rt s = 100 − 20s. Consider a quadratic distutility function φ(y) = 50y + 50y 2 . In this example, both Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied.
We consider three cases: (a) optimal scheduling without demand response, (b) spot market with contingent pricing, and (c) options market. We compute the optimal decisions in each case and derive the competitive equilibrium for both markets. The system costs in these cases are compared. 1. Optimal Scheduling without Demand Response: The LSE buys energy from the day-ahead and real-time markets. Using Proposition 1, the optimal day-ahead purchase is q e ndr = 2.06 MW. The optimal system cost is J (18), the optimal day-ahead purchase is q * = 1.93 MW. The optimal load reduction and contingent price given the information state s are shown in Figures 2 and 3 respectively. Figure 2 reveals that when s is larger, the LSE expects more wind at the delivery time T and therefore calls on less load reduction at the intermediate time t 1 . As a result, the competitive equilibrium price is lower when s is larger, as shown in Figure 3 . Any point in he shaded area of Figure 3 (s > 0.8) is a competitive equilibrium. In this area, the options price is too high for the LSE to buy demand response, and too low for the aggregator to sell demand response. Therefore, no load reduction is traded. When the options price is above (below) this area, the aggregator is willing (unwilling) to sell, but the LSE is unwilling (willing) to buy. Thus, points outside the shaded area do not support a competitive equilibrium. 4. Options Market: The competitive equilibrium in the options market can be determined by solving (27). Figure 4 shows the volume x of options traded and the volume y s of options exercised as a function of the strike price at various information states. When π sp ≤ 37$/M W h, the LSE always calls for the maximum load reduction, i.e., y s = x for all s. When π sp ≥ 94$/M W h, the LSE does not call for any load reduction. This is because the strike price is too expensive to justify purchasing demand reduction. As a result the option volumes and the option price are both 0 for this range of parameter. The dependence of the option price π o on the strike price π sp at the competitive equilibrium is shown in Figure 5 . When the strike price is between 65$/M W h and 94$/M W h, the options price is negative. In this case the aggregator makes profit by charging a high strike price π sp for exercising the options. Figure 6 compares the system costs for the three cases: (a) optimal scheduling without demand response, (b) spot market with contingent pricing, and (c) options market. As proved in Proposition 4 we observe that the system cost for options market outperforms that of the optimal scheduling without demand response, but is larger than the spot market with contingent pricing. The optimal social cost is attained at the strike price π * LSE = 58.2$/M W h. Based on Figure 5 , the corresponding options price is π * o = 3.9$/M W h. Figure  7 shows the load reduction as a function of information state when the strike price is optimal. The volume of load reduction decreases as the information state increases. 
VII. CONCLUSION
We have studied a novel market model for trading demand response using options. We have shown that demand response can be used as an intermediate recourse between the real-time market and the day-ahead market. Under some conditions, this options market admits a competitive equilibrium. We studied the efficiency of this equilibrium, and obtained the optimal strike price that yields the minimum system cost at the competitive equilibrium. In future work we plan to address option markets with multiple intermediate stages and also the case where the LSE can exercise market power.
VIII. PROOFS

A. Proof of Proposition 1
The objective function J 
Since the second derivative is non-negative, J e ndr is convex. The solution is obtained by equating the first derivative to zero.
B. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The cost of the second stage is,
Taking partial derivatives, we have,
Since the second order derivative is non-negative, J 
This leads to (11) . Next, we compute the right derivative of the first stage cost J e (q), 
Similarly, we can derive the left derivative of J e (q). It equals the right derivative. Therefore, J e (q) is differentiable with respect to q. The second-order right derivative of J e (q) is as follows,
To prove Proposition 2, it suffices to show that J e (q) is convex with respect to q. If so, the optimal decision is obtained by equating the first derivative to 0, which leads to (12) . To this end, we show that 
C. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. It suffices to show there exists a solution to (16) , and any solution to (16) satisfies (18) . According to Proposition 2, it suffices to show that (16) is equivalent to (11) and (12) . Given any q, the optimal solution to (16b) is given by
For any q, the optimal solution to (16c) is given by,
Proof for (36) and (37) is similar to that of Proposition 2 and hence we skip the details. Since (36) is continuous and decreasing, and (37) is continuous and increasing, there is an intersection. Thus the competitive equilibrium exists. It can be verified that at the intersection, the equilibrium satisfies (11) . In addition, based on (36), the derivative of the first stage cost of the LSE is given by,
At the optimal decision q * LSE , we have,
Therefore, (16) is equivalent to (11) and (12). This completes the proof.
D. Proof of Theorem 2
We first prove a series of lemmas before giving the proof of Theorem 2. is given by,
Proof. The second-stage cost for the LSE is,
The first-order and second-order derivative are as follows,
Since the second derivative is positive,J LSE s (y) is strictly convex. Then using first derivative and the strict convexity property the expression for the unique minimizerỹ LSE s follows.
Lemma 2. The functionJ LSE (q, x) is jointly convex in q and x. The minimizers (q LSE , x LSE ) are given by,
Proof. Let s 1 , s 2 ∈ S be such that y s = x for 0 ≤ s ≤ s 1 and y s = 0 for s 2 ≤ s ≤ 1. Note that s 1 and s 2 depends on q and x from the first stage. Then,J LSE (q, x) (c.f. (19)) can be written as,
We give simplified expressions for the partial derivatives of J LSE w.r.t q and x below,
Once again differentiating the above expressions w.r.t q and x we get,
It follows that the Hessian will be of the form
Now, by Silvester's criterion, this Hessian is positive semidefinite. Hence by convexity the minimizers of LSE cost satisfy (41).
Lemma 3. The cost function of the aggregatorJ agg (x) is convex in x.
Proof. Define s 1 and s 2 in the same way as in the proof of Lemma 2. Recall that s 1 denotes the information state below which the LSE schedules all of the options and s 2 denotes the information state above which the LSE does not schedule any of the demand response at all. These varaibles depend on the decision of the LSE which are in turn only dependent on the option prices π o and π sp , which are fixed. As a result, s 1 and s 2 will not be affected by the aggregator's decision x. The cost functionJ agg (x) is as follows,
The first order derivative ofJ agg (x) is given by,
The second order derivative is given by,
Clearly,J agg (x) is convex.
Next we show the continuity ofq
using the implicit function theorem. We omit the details for the proof of continuity of
Lemma 4. The minimizers of LSE costJ
Proof. By Lemma 2, the minimizersq LSE , x LSE satisfy conditions (41). Define, 2 ) will be negative. Now, the existence of (π * o , π * LSE ) follows from the continuity of z(·, ·).
E. Proof of Theorem 3
We first prove the following lemma before giving the proof of Theorem 3.
Lemma 5. The functionJ LSE (x) is convex with respect to x.
Proof. We first plug in the second-stage decision (40) in the net expected cost function (19) . Recall that s 1 and s 2 is defined as (??). Then,J LSE (x) (c.f. (19) ) is given by, Since the second order derivative is non-negative,J LSE (x) is convex.
According to Lemma 3 and Lemma 5, the supply curve is continuous and increasing. The demand curve is continuous and decreasing. Therefore, there exists an intersection. This is the competitive equilibrium.
Next we show that the competitive equilibrium is the solution to (27). Let (π * o ,x * LSE ,ỹ LSE s ,x * agg ) be a competitive equilibrium. For notation convenience, we define the following,
By definition, the competitive equilibrium satisfies
Let x * =x * LSE =x * agg , then (46a) is same as,
and (46b) is same as,
Let z = x, then (47) plus (48) gives,
